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Abstract 
Rising seas and more frequent and severe storms are increasing the risks and costs of flooding. Using 
2009-2018 data for the U.S. state of Florida from FEMA’s Community Rating System program (CRS), 
which scores participating local governments on their flood risk mitigation activities: I study (1) whether 
increasing flood risks have led to increases in program participation and score among Florida towns and 
cities; (2) what risk, fiscal, and demographic factors are driving local governments to invest in CRS-
recognized flood risk mitigation measures; and (3) the association between CRS measures and home 
values. 
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Flood events are the costliest natural disasters in the United States, causing 
significant annual losses to individuals, business, properties, and infrastructure.  
According to the National Weather Service’s (NWS) Annual Flood Loss Summary 
Reports, floods accounted for 1,130 fatalities and over $104 billion in damages 
from 2007 to 2018 (NWS, 2007-2018).  Furthermore, due to more intensive 
floodplain development and the effects of climate change, the annual costs of 
flooding are increasing – Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) data 
on “significant flood events” (events resulting in 1,500 or more insurance-paid 
losses) indicates that floods between 2006 and 2016 resulted in $20.6 billion in 
insurance-paid losses, compared to $7.3 billion from 1994 to 2004 (FEMA, 2019).   
Along the coasts, the already considerable risks and costs posed by floods 
and storms will be multiplied in coming decades, as rising seas threaten 
communities and infrastructure.  According to the United Nations’ 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Special Report on the Ocean 
and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, global mean sea levels are projected to rise 
1.4 to 2.8 feet relative to 1985-2005 levels by 2100, depending on the emissions 
scenario (IPCC, 2019).  Localized rates of sea level rise will vary widely.  Along 
the Eastern Seaboard of the United States, a slowing Gulf Stream, shifts in weather 
patterns, and effects from El Niño climate cycles are contributing to faster rates of 
sea level rise, with some communities reporting annual rises from 2011 to 2015 
more than three times higher than the global mean rate (Morrison, 2018; Valle‐
Levinson et al., 2017).   
Rising seas are already affecting daily life in these communities, with 
“sunny day flooding” – high tides pushing seawater into low-lying areas – posing 
a growing problem for local governments and residents.  Miami, FL has seen a 
more than 400% increase in such flood events since 2006; Boston recorded 19 high 
tide flooding days in 2018 (Wdowinski et al., 2016; Page, 2019).  In addition to 
tidal flooding, the frequency and severity of storms and hurricanes is increasing, 
with a “100-year” storm surge event projected to become a “10-year” event by 2050 
(a 1% annual probability increasing to a 10% probability) and average and extreme 
rainfall totals increasing (Tebaldi et al., 2012; Patricola & Wehner, 2018).  
The growing frequency of sunny day flooding and the growing risks from 
more frequent and severe storms are contributing to lower home values and 
disruptions to economic activity.  According to an analysis by McAlpine and Porter 
(2018), the Miami-Dade, FL metropolitan area lost over $465 million in real-estate 
value between 2005 and 2016, as tidal flooding and sea level rise contributed to 
slower appreciation in home prices in at-risk areas.  Per Hino et al. (2019), 
businesses in downtown Annapolis, MD lost as much as $172,000 in revenue in 
2017, as repeat tidal flooding events contributed to lower visits and dollars spent.  
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Looking forward, according to a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists 
(2018), more than 300,000 homes, with a collective valuation of $117.5 billion, are 
at risk of regular flooding by 2045, and properties worth more than $1 trillion could 
be at risk by 2100. 
In the face of these numbers, some local governments are acting, investing 
hundreds of millions of dollars in engineering solutions to safeguard property and 
infrastructure, implementing stricter building codes, and increasing public 
awareness of flood risks.  The city of Miami Beach, Florida, home to an estimated 
$5.7 billion in residential property at risk of regular flooding by 2050 (Climate 
Central), is investing $650 million in improving drainage systems, elevating roads 
and public seawalls, installing pumps to replace gravity-based stormwater pipes, 
and re-nourishing beaches.  Additionally, the city has made policy and regulatory 
changes, such as requiring all new buildings and seawalls to meet increased 
elevation requirements.  Funding for these resiliency investments, spread over a 15-
year interval, comes from a combination of special bond measures secured through 
a tripling of local stormwater fees, a general obligation bond secured through 
property tax increases, and tax increment financing (Plastrik, 2019).   
Charleston, South Carolina, where local sea level has risen 1.07 feet over 
the past century, is also a leader in flood and sea level rise resiliency planning and 
investment.  The city’s 2019 “Flooding and Sea Level Rise Strategy” requires all 
new and substantially improved structures to be elevated 2 feet above the “100-
year” flood stage, and the plan calls for the city to acquire and demolish repeatedly 
flooded structures.  Major infrastructure investments in the plan, totaling $512 
million, include drainage improvements, stormwater pumps, and higher seawalls.  
Funding comes from local stormwater fees and hospitality taxes, with the city 
tapping FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance funds for property acquisitions.  
Similarly, Hoboken, New Jersey’s “Resist, Delay, Store, Discharge” plan includes 
a $230 million investment in pumps and coastal flood hazard mitigation projects, 
including a new park along the Hudson River that doubles as a system of storm 
surge levees.  Funding comes from federal Hurricane Sandy recovery dollars, 
infrastructure and park grants from the state, local bonds, and partnerships with real 
estate developers (Plastrik, 2019).   
A few common themes emerge from these examples of local government 
efforts to adapt to climate change and rising flood risks: the political impetus for 
investment and planning generally comes from local political leaders and activists, 
and funding sources are usually local.  Federal funding for such projects is limited, 
as there are few nationwide frameworks for boosting flood resiliency proactively 
or for addressing climate change (Morrison, 2019).1  The two examples of federal 
 
1 FEMA launched the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program in 
August 2020 (after the submission of this thesis), which makes $500 million available to states 
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funds discussed above – Charleston’s use of FEMA Hazard Mitigation grants and 
Hoboken’s tapping of federal Hurricane Sandy recovery funds – were only made 
possible after the two cities experienced hurricane impacts (in Charleston’s case, 
Hurricane Joaquin in 2015 and Hurricane Matthew in 2016).   
Are the examples of Miami Beach, Charleston, and Hoboken reflective of a 
larger trend whereby cities and towns across the country are responding to rising 
climate risks by investing in flood risk mitigation measures?  Relatedly, since most 
such investment is made (and funded) locally, what are the characteristics of the 
towns and cities that are taking these proactive (and expensive) measures?  Pumps, 
new drainage systems, and higher streets and seawalls all carry hefty price tags, 
which means that smaller and poorer towns may not have the resources to afford 
these measures.  Finally, in communities that are making these investments, are 
home prices rising, much in the same way they do in response to higher quality 
schools or lower crime, and do those changes differ by flood risk or income level? 
In this thesis, I review prior literature on flood prevention, present an 
economic framework explaining how flood prevention investments may relate to 
home values, and then examine these questions using data for the state of Florida 
from 2009 to 2018.  I compile a panel data set combining information from FEMA’s 
Community Rating System (CRS), which scores participating local governments 
on their flood risk mitigation activities, with datasets on city-level characteristics, 
fiscal capacity, tax rates, and spending on other public goods.  Using regression 
analysis, I find that investments in public flood risk mitigation are increasing over 
time, with an 11.8% increase in CRS program participation and a 19.8% increase 
in average “active” CRS scores among Florida municipalities from 2009-2018.  
This increase in active scores suggests that local governments in Florida are 
investing more in stormwater systems and flood protection infrastructure, setting 
stricter building codes, and acquiring and demolishing at-risk properties.  As may 
be expected, CRS program participation is significantly related to flood risk, higher 
population density, higher median income, and more owner-occupied homes.  
Active CRS scores are also highest in the cities with more land area in flood zones 
and higher populations.  However, in contrast to standard economic theories, cities 
with higher scores are also those with greater inequality, lower population densities, 
lower median incomes, and less financial capacity.  Meanwhile, the cities with the 
greatest increases in score from 2009-2018 have less land area in flood zones, 
higher debt loads, and lower inequality.  Using panel estimation with city-level 
fixed effects, I find that participation in the CRS program is positively but not 
statistically significant related to median home values, with a point estimate of an 
increase of $3,580 to $5,680.  Active CRS scores are negatively related to home 
values, with every 100-point increase associated with a $6,250 decrease in values 
 
and local governments for mitigation activities. This program is the first example of a large-scale 
pre-disaster mitigation fund from the federal government.  
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in an average community.  I find evidence for less negative (or positive) effects in 
communities with more land area in flood zones and higher median incomes.   
These results suggest program participation may be driven by factors 
different from those influencing higher “active” CRS scores.  While the CRS 
program is adequately incentivizing some higher flood risk communities to invest 
in active CRS mitigation measures, even if they have fewer financial resources, the 
program does not appear to be adequately targeting and incentivizing denser 
communities with potentially higher mitigation costs to invest in these measures.  
Finally, housing markets do not appear to value these flood risk mitigation 
measures, suggesting that the costs to local communities may exceed the 




This research builds on the broader literatures on the determinants of public 
expenditure decisions, governmental adoption and implementation of risk 
mitigation measures, housing market responses to public goods provision, and the 
economic costs of climate change by examining FEMA’s Community Rating 
System (CRS).  The CRS is a voluntary incentive program for local governments 
that encourages and rates community flood management activities that exceed those 
required for participation in the National Flood Insurance Program (FEMA, 2017).  
 
2.1. The National Flood Insurance Program 
 
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), enacted by the U.S. 
Congress in 1968, is the primary tool used by the federal government to promote 
flood risk management and flood recovery.  Congress established the program with 
multiple objectives in mind: 
 
• Ensure the affordability of flood insurance premiums 
• Increase flood risk awareness through risk-based premiums  
• Secure widespread participation in the program by communities and 
property owners 
• Earn premium income that would – over time – cover all program expenses  
• Stem the rising cost of taxpayer-funded flood disaster relief (National 
Research Council, 2015)  
 
As currently structured, the NFIP is a joint venture between the federal government, 
state and local governments, and private insurers.  In addition to setting flood-
insurance premiums, issuing policies, and paying policy claims, the federal 
government is responsible for producing detailed flood risk maps for premium-
6
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setting and risk communication purposes.  FEMA, which oversees the NFIP, also 
offers grant programs in support of pre-disaster risk mitigation and post-disaster 
recovery efforts (National Research Council, 2015).  State governments exercise 
regulatory authority over insurance contracts within their borders, and local 
governments can only opt into the federal insurance program if they adopt adequate 
minimum floodplain management regulations.  Private insurers market and sell 
policies and adjust flood claims on behalf of the federal government, but all risk is 
fully underwritten by the federal government (Li and Landry, 2018).  
The structure of the NFIP has led to shortcomings, including low rates of 
insurance take-up among homeowners, a large and growing structural deficit, and 
outdated flood maps that do not reflect the growing risks from climate change.  The 
number of policies in force has declined from a peak of 5.7 million in 2009 to 5 
million in 2017.  Earned premiums in 2016 and 2017 totaled $3.33 and $3.57 
billion, while flood claim payments totaled $3.7 and $8.7 billion (Insurance 
Information Institute, 2019).  In 2017, the NFIP reached its authorized borrowing 
limit of $30.425 billion; the U.S. Congress subsequently cancelled $16 billion 
worth of debt to allow the program to pay off claims following Hurricanes Harvey, 
Irma, and Maria.  As of 2019, the program’s outstanding debt stands at $20.525 
billion (Horn, 2019).  This legacy of debt has led to renewed attempts to study (and 
improve) the program. 
 
2.2. The Community Rating System 
 
In order to strengthen the NFIP, incentivize household flood insurance take-
up, and promote community-level flood hazard mitigation, FEMA created the 
Community Rating System (CRS) in 1990.  The CRS is a voluntary incentive 
program for local governments that “encourages community floodplain 
management activities that exceed the minimum NFIP requirements.”  
Homeowners’ flood insurance premium rates are discounted according to the 
degree of community participation in efforts to meet the three primary goals of the 
CRS:   
 
• Reduce flood damage to insurable property 
• Strengthen and support the insurance aspects of the NFIP 
• Foster comprehensive floodplain management (FEMA, 2017)  
 
Local governments that opt into the CRS program are awarded points based on their 
commitment to and adoption of specific floodplain management activities 
organized under 4 categories: (1) Public information, (2) Flood mapping and 
regulation, (3) Flood damage reduction, and (4) Flood preparedness.  The 
maximum possible point total is 12,654, and point totals translate into a CRS 
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classification, ranging from 10 (the “entry-level” score: less than 500 points) to 1 
(the highest score: more than 4500 points).2 Based on this classification, 
community flood insurance premium discounts range from 5% to 45% (FEMA, 
2017).  
 
2.3. Investing in Flood Risk Mitigation 
 
 The benefits to local governments of participating in the CRS are clear: 
community involvement secures immediate flood insurance premium discounts for 
property owners.  In 2019, Miami Beach, FL improved its CRS rating from Class 
6 to Class 5, securing an additional $2 million in annual insurance premium savings 
for city residents and businesses.  The city’s Class 5 rating provides all 
policyholders with a 25% flood insurance discount, which translates into $8.4 
million in total annual savings (Miami Beach Rising Above, 2019).   
Further, empirical studies have demonstrated that CRS participation 
reduces flood damages and increases flood insurance take up.  Using data from 
1998 to 2014 for all NFIP communities in Alabama and Mississippi, Frimpong et. 
al. (2019) find that Class 5 CRS ratings are associated with a 5.8% reduction in the 
magnitude of damage claims in the aftermath of a flood event (versus not 
participating in the CRS).  They find negative – but less significant – effects for 
Class 7 and Class 6 communities.  Similarly, looking at data from Florida for the 
years 2000-2005, Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010) find a 7% to 9% reduction in 
flood claim amounts among Class 5 communities, with negative (but insignificant) 
effects for communities with Class 6 through 9 ratings.  Brody et. al. (2007), 
looking at data from Florida coastal counties from 1997 to 2001, find a much larger 
effect from CRS participation, reporting that every increase in CRS rating reduces 
average flood damages by $303,525.  Given a reported $2.6 million mean flood 
event total loss value, a Class 5 community would see a 58% reduction in flood 
damages.   
Additionally, CRS participation is associated with an increased rate of flood 
insurance take up among homeowners.  Per Frimpong et al. (2019), CRS 
participating communities see significantly higher rates of insurance take up than 
non-participating communities, with increasing participation as community CRS 
rating improves.  According to their model, NFIP participation in Class 5 CRS 
communities is 142% higher compared to non-CRS communities and 30% higher 
than other CRS-participating communities.  Meanwhile, higher rates of NFIP 
participation create positive externalities, since federal flood insurance provides 
 
2 Zahran and Brody (2010) find that communities are “gaming” the non-linear, tiered classification 
structure, with a clustering of point totals just above each classification’s point requirement.  This 
precludes a “regression discontinuity” approach to this thesis.   
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funds faster and in greater amounts than federal disaster aid alone.  This speeds 
community rebuilding and recovery in the wake of a disaster (Kousky, 2017).  
However, CRS participation is costly.  Per Li and Landry (2018), flood 
hazard identification, assessment, and management are resource intensive, 
requiring skilled personnel and capital investments.  Aside from any immediate 
insurance premium discounts offered by the CRS, the benefits of investing in 
hazard mitigation come only in the aftermath of flood events and are difficult to 
quantify.  More immediate concerns, such as crime or economic development, may 
crowd out concerns relating to the uncertain risks of future flood and disaster 
events.  Further, flood-prone areas are often prime real estate – effective floodplain 
management policies may require restricting development or adding regulations 
that make building more costly, thus reducing property tax revenues and attracting 
opposition from developers and property owners.  The authors find that 
communities with more fiscal resources do in fact engage in more flood hazard 
mitigation activities, with the effect particularly significant for more costly (and 
effective) mitigation activities relating to flood protection and property acquisition.  
Conversely, higher rates of crime and unemployment are associated with fewer 
mitigation activities, suggesting that a crowding out effect does exist.  Brody et al. 
(2009) find that the most significant driving factor for CRS participation is the 
premium discounts offered by the program – increases in population density and 
insured property value lead to higher potential per capita gains from participation, 
which in turn incentivizes community flood risk mitigation activities.   
In addition to socio-economic factors, flood history and the salience of past 
flood events influence community mitigation decisions.  Li and Landry (2018) find 
that an increase in the number of flood events in the past year drives a small (but 
significant) increase in mitigation activities, whereas more distant flood events 
have no significant impact.  Brody et al. (2009) find that an increase in the 
frequency (but not intensity) of flood events over the preceding 10 years induces 
modest policy change.  Given that community flood mitigation policy decisions are 
a function of the political process, these results reflect individual actions in the 
wake of disaster events.  Specifically, Beracha and Prati (2008) find little long-term 
effects on home prices in zip codes impacted by hurricanes, suggesting that disaster 
events may lead to transitory changes in risk salience but few long-term effects.   
The factors that influence why certain communities engage in flood risk 
mitigation are a central focus of the empirical literature, with certain patterns 
emerging in predictable ways – wealthier and denser communities with a longer 
history of flooding invest more in mitigation, while poorer communities tend to 
underinvest in beneficial mitigation activities.   
 
2.4. Valuing Flood Risk Mitigation 
 
9
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A less studied area within the literature is the value that individuals and 
homeowners place on flood risk, flood risk mitigation, and community CRS 
participation.  Bin et al. (2008), employing a GIS-based measure of view in order 
to isolate risk factors from amenity factors that are often highly correlated (e.g. 
flood risk and water views), find a significant 11% discount for properties in flood 
hazard zones.  Meanwhile, Husby et al. (2018), tying an assumption that spatial 
differences in flood risk and flood protection are priced in by housing markets, 
construct a residential sorting model to illustrate that lower home prices in riskier 
locations will induce lower-income households to migrate to those areas.  This 
follows the literature on Tiebout-sorting, which suggests that supply and quality of 
public goods drives household migration decisions.   
Returning to the CRS literature, Fan and Davlasheridze (2016) analyze 
households’ flood risk perceptions and willingness to pay (WTP) for community 
CRS mitigation activities, finding that wealthier and more educated households 
have a higher WTP for CRS activities.  Their paper employs a residential sorting 
model to examine location choices under changes in flood risk and local mitigation 
policies across U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas, finding heterogeneity in risk 
perception and WTP based on age, ethnicity and race, educational attainment, and 
prior risk exposure.  Their results follow the convention that wealthier households 
tend to value (and be able to pay for) higher quality public services, and they find 
that the value households place on CRS activities exceeds the insurance discounts 
on offer through the program, suggesting a preference for community safety and 
mitigated flood risks beyond the immediate benefits that come from lower 
insurance premiums.   
 
2.5. Pricing in Climate Change 
 
A related body of literature focuses on the general question of whether 
market dynamics and prices are reflecting the growing flood and storm risks posed 
by climate change.  Keenan et al. (2018) find evidence of “climate gentrification” 
in Miami-Dade County, whereby the rates of price appreciation for single-family 
homes at lower elevations have not kept pace with the rates of appreciation for 
homes at higher elevations.  Similarly, looking at coastal home valuations across 
the country, Bernstein, Gustafson, and Lewis (2018) find that homes exposed to sea 
level rise risk are trading at a 7% discount versus otherwise observably equivalent 
properties, with heterogeneity in climate risk capitalization across sophisticated and 
less-sophisticated market segments (non-owner occupied vs. owner-occupied 
homes).  Walsh et al. (2019) examine the impact of both sea level rise and risk 
mitigating measures on coastal home values in Anne Arundel County, Maryland.  
Employing a hedonic model to examine the price effects of private flood protection 
measures, they find that certain structures (bulkheads and ripraps) have a positive 
10
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effect on home prices, with the effects strongest for homes most exposed to sea 




There is a large body of literature on the determinants and benefits of 
community flood risk mitigation investments, housing market responses to spatial 
differences in flood and sea level rise risk, households’ willingness to pay for 
mitigation, and the CRS program.  My thesis seeks to build on these studies of the 
CRS program by adding two new dimensions – a more recent study period (2009-
2018)3 and an analysis of whether home prices respond to program participation.  
Specifically: I examine whether increasing flood risks during this time period have 
led to increases in program participation and increases in score among participants; 
I look at the socio-economic characteristics of the communities that are 
participating and the participating communities that are increasing their scores, 
along the lines of Brody et al. (2009) and Li and Landry (2018); and I study the 
relationship between CRS program participation and home values and active CRS 




In analyzing local governments’ CRS-credit earning flood risk mitigation 
investments and any associated home value changes, I first turn to the seminal study 
of Oates (1969), who showed that property values are positively associated with 
public goods provision and negatively associated with property tax rates.  This 
“capitalization effect” demonstrates that consumers value public goods, and this is 
manifested in higher home values in communities that provide higher quality public 
goods (e.g. low crime and good schools).  Brueckner (1982) extends this result to 
show that the use of a property values capitalization approach “provides a way for 
local governments to set public-good levels in a socially optimal manner” 
(Brueckner, 2011).  Referencing these two studies, and drawing upon Brueckner 
(2011), I first demonstrate the relationship between public good levels and property 
values, and then I build a (stylized) bid-rent model for my context of public flood 





3 Other studies of CRS program participation examine periods prior to 2013, when CRS program 
scoring criteria changed. This presents an empirical challenge; I deal with this change in 
Appendix A.   
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Consider the rental housing market.  Suppose that the utility of a renter 
household in any town depends on non-housing consumption C, housing 
consumption H, and consumption of a standard public good G (e.g. fire protection).  
Consumption of G is determined by location choice – where a household rents 
determines which bundle of municipal public goods it consumes.  Each household 
faces a budget constraint, spending some percentage of income on H (in the form 
of rent R) and the remainder on C.  Formally, each household maximizes utility 
subject to its budget constraint: 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 u(C,H,G) 
s.t. Y = C + R 
 
In equilibrium, all households with a given income must obtain the same utility 
regardless of location choice.  That is, if living in Town A supplies a household 
with higher G (e.g. faster fire department response times), while living in Town B 
supplies a household with lower G (slower response times), households in A must 
necessarily pay a higher rent than in B (for an otherwise identical housing unit).  
This allows households in Town B to enjoy a higher level of consumption of the 
non-housing good, ensuring that the two households achieve the same overall utility 
level.  Otherwise, households would sort between the two towns, bidding up (or 
down) rental prices until utility was equalized.  Housing rents are thus a function 
of the level of public goods supplied by the local government: 
 
R = R(G) 
 
 Housing values, meanwhile, are directly linked to rents: the value of a rental 
property is equal to the present discounted value of the lifetime income (rent) that 
flows to the owner, minus any operating costs.  Continuing in the Brueckner (2011) 
framework, a major operating cost for property owners is the annual property tax 
T.  Allowing δ to be the discount rate, the value V of an individual home is equal to 
the present discounted value of the annual rental price it commands minus the 









Property values are thus positively associated with rents (themselves positively 
associated with the level of public goods) and negatively associated with taxes.   
 
3.2. Property Value Maximization 
12
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Now suppose that each town is governed by a town manager, who is 
empowered to make tax and spend decisions for the town and who is assumed to 
act through a property-value-maximizing lens.  The town manager has access to the 
jurisdiction’s property value information, as well as the costs of providing each unit 
of the public good, which are fully borne by town residents through a property tax.  
The manager’s decision problem involves weighing the marginal benefits of each 
additional unit of the public good versus the marginal cost – e.g. are the benefits 
from an additional firehouse (through faster response times for each household) 
greater than the cost?  Recalling that home values are linked to rents (themselves a 
function of G) and taxes (which pay for G), the decision problem involves 
determining whether the increase in annual rents from an additional unit of the 
public good exceeds the increase in annual taxes.  Formally, assuming just one time 
period and a discount rate of 0 for simplicity (N=1, δ=0), each town manager 
maximizes aggregate property values (equal to the sum of the values of all K homes 
in the town), whereby the sum of all annual taxes equals the annual cost c(G) of 















If we assume that the marginal benefits from each additional unit of the public good 
are decreasing (the 2nd firehouse will provide fewer benefits than the first), there 
will come a point where the marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits of an 
additional unit of G: the current level of the public good is “socially optimal.”  This 
optimal level corresponds to the property-value-maximizing level – an additional 
unit of the public good would cause property values to decrease, since the marginal 
cost (paid for through higher property taxes) exceeds the marginal benefit.  
Meanwhile, the presence of other jurisdictions – and the threat of “voting-with-
your-feet” – ensures that town managers have an incentive to achieve this optimal 
level of public goods provision.  Otherwise, households would sort into another 
community that provide a more desirable bundle of home prices, public goods, and 
tax levels, and home values in the “non-optimizing” town would decrease. 
 
3.3. The Optimal Level of Flood Protection  
 
Consider the following example, which illustrates this process of property-
value-maximizing in a context of fire and flood risk.  Suppose first that a town has 
three renter households (K=3, for simplicity) living in identical homes, with each 
home commanding an annual rent of $10,000.  The town manager has latitude to 
13
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determine both the level of fire protection provision G and the level of flood 
protection provision P, with G funded by a tax of T and P by a tax of 𝑇′ levied on 
each home.  The town currently supplies one “unit” of G (a firehouse) at an annual 
total cost of $150 divided equally between the three homes (T=$50). In any given 
year, there is some probability f of a fire destroying a home, with f a function of a 
home’s fire risk and the town’s level of G.  Additionally, the town is subject to 
coastal flooding, and there is some annual probability q of a flood destroying a 
home, with q a function of the town’s flood risk and the town’s level of P.  In the 
event of a flood or fire, the annual rent that a (now nonexistent) home commands 
is 0.  In the presence of the firehouse (G=1), f is equal to 0.020.  In the absence of 
any flood protection (P=0), q is equal to 0.10.  The property value of home k is then 
equal to the rental income it commands multiplied by the probability that the home 
is not destroyed, net of all taxes.  Formally, assuming 1 time period and a discount 
rate of 0 for simplicity (N=1, δ=0):  
 
𝑉𝑘 = 𝑅𝑘 ∗ (1 – 𝑓 − 𝑞) − (𝑇 + 𝑇
′) 
 
Suppose that the local government now invests in one “unit” of flood 
protection (e.g. all seawalls are raised by one foot) at a total cost of $450, on top of 
the existing provision of G.  The higher seawalls reduce the annual probability of a 
destructive flood to 0.060, as a flood event would have to be more severe for waters 
to crest the new (higher) seawalls.  The value of each home goes up by $400 to 
reflect the (now lower) probability of destruction.  However, the total cost of raising 
the seawalls is $450 (assessed through a new tax on each home of 𝑇′=$150), and 
this additional annual cost reduces the increase in each home’s value to $250.  
Summing up the costs and benefits of this first unit of P, the aggregate property 
value of the town’s 3 homes rises to $27,000.  Table 1 presents the numbers: 
 
Table 1.  
 
The table presents a scenario where every additional unit of P carries with it 
decreasing marginal benefits, a reasonable assumption given the example of 
seawalls (or other flood risk mitigation measures, e.g. more stringent building 
codes).  As can be seen from the table, property values are maximized when P=2: 
the marginal costs of increasing P to 3 outweigh the marginal benefits.  P=2 is thus 
G P f q R * 
(1–f–q) 






of this unit of P 
Marginal 
benefit of this 
unit of P 
1 0 0.020 0.10 8,800 50 0 8,750 26,250 0 0 
1 1 0.020 0.060 9,200 50 150 9,000 27,000 450 1200 
1 2 0.020 0.035 9,450 50 300 9,100 27,300 450 750 
1 3 0.020 0.025 9,550 50 450 9,050 27,150 450 300 
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the “efficient” level of public flood protection provision for this town.  At any point 
above P=2, home values would decrease.  
Suppose that the above result – that of an “efficient” level of P=2 – holds 
for one time period.  However, suppose that the probability of flood events is 
increasing due to climate change.  In Table 2, the probability of flood events has 
increased – from 0.10 to 0.15 at baseline, and from 0.025 to 0.030 when P=3 – and 




 This (stylized) model presents three assumptions: given increasing flood 
risks due to climate change, the “optimal” level of public flood protection provision 
is increasing, and we would expect increases in provision of this public good among 
towns.  Meanwhile, given the reality of heterogeneity between towns – whether in 
flood risk, the marginal costs of flood protection provision (e.g. differences in 
population density or shoreline length would present different mitigation costs), or 
the marginal benefits of flood protection provision (e.g. a town with more valuable 
real estate would have a larger incentive to invest) – we would expect differences 
in flood protection provision across towns.  Finally, if flood protection provision is 
viewed as a public good, we would expect housing markets to respond to its 





These preceding three (testable) assumptions motivate my empirical 
questions: (1) are local governments increasing their investment in public flood 
protection provision as flood risks increase, as would be expected under their 
adjustment to the “social optimum?”  Further, every town differs in its 
socioeconomic and demographic makeup, financial capacity, and political 
priorities, and each may choose to invest in a different level of flood mitigation – 
(2) what factors are associated with local governments that do invest in flood 
protection?  Finally, (3) is there a relationship between flood provision and home 
values, and how might this vary by flood risk or residents’ income levels?  
G P f q R * 
(1–f–q) 






of this unit of P 
Marginal 
benefit of this 
unit of P 
1 0 0.020 0.15 8,300 50 0 8,250 24,750 0 0 
1 1 0.020 0.080 9,000 50 150 8,800 26,400 450 2100 
1 2 0.020 0.050 9,300 50 300 8,950 26,850 450 900 
1 3 0.020 0.030 9,500 50 450 9,000 27,000 450 600 
1 4 0.020 0.020 9,600 50 600 8,950 26,850 450 300 
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4.1. Empirical Strategy 
  
 To answer these three questions, I build a dataset of 405 municipalities in 
the state of Florida,4 combining data from FEMA, the U.S. Census Bureau, the 
Florida Department of Revenue, and the Florida Department of Financial Services.  
The FEMA data includes a dataset from the Community Rating System (CRS), 
which provides a detailed score breakdown for all Florida jurisdictions participating 
in the program from 2009-2018.5 I first code each Florida jurisdiction based on 
whether it participates in the CRS program in each year: “1” for participating 
communities, “0” for non-participating communities.  Following Sadiq and 
Noonan’s (2015) classification of risk-reducing measures, I next break down 
participating community’s CRS point totals into an “active” subtotal, defined as the 
sum of score totals for select series 400, 500, and 600 activities.6 These “active” 
activities require large capital outlays (flood protection infrastructure), impose 
large costs on property owners (stronger regulatory standards), or result in large 
foregone tax revenues (open space preservation) and thus are more likely to 
influence property values.  I employ Active CRS score as my proxy for a local 
government’s investment in public flood protection provision.  The maximum 
possible score total is 10,649 (FEMA, 2017), but the range of scores in my dataset 
tops out at just 1,889 points.7  Table 3 summarizes all variables I use in my analysis, 




4 My dataset includes all Florida cities, towns, and villages, except for those owned by the Walt 
Disney Co. (Bay Lake and Lake Buena Vista) and those with populations below 100 (removed 
after an outlier analysis).  
5 I received this data on October 18, 2019 following an email request to Bill Lesser, the national 
CRS coordinator at FEMA’s Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration. 
6 My dataset includes towns that switched between FEMA scoring regimes after 2013; my 
approach for dealing with this change is in Appendix A. 
7 In most of these “active” CRS subcategories, the maximum possible score is significantly higher 








A categorical variable recording whether a 
municipality participates (1) or does not 
participate (0) in the FEMA CRS program.  
2009-
2018 
Obtained from FEMA’s Federal 
Insurance and Mitigation 
Administration (FIMA) on October 
18, 2019 following an email request to 




The sum of points awarded by FEMA each 
year to a local government for “active” 
flood plain management activities, which I 
define as Class 420 (Open Space 
2009-
2018 
Obtained from FEMA’s Federal 
Insurance and Mitigation 
Administration (FIMA) on October 
18, 2019 following an email request to 
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Preservation), 430 (Higher Regulatory 
Standards), 450 (Stormwater 
Management), 510 (Floodplain 
Management Planning), 520 (Acquisition 
and Relocation), 530 (Flood Protection), 
540 (Drainage System Maintenance), 610 
(Flood Warning and Response), 620 
(Levees), and 630 (Dams) activities.  
 





The proportion of a municipality’s land 
area that is in a FEMA-designated “High 
Risk” flood area. FEMA periodically 
updates flood maps (roughly every 10 




Flood map overlays downloaded from 
the FEMA Flood Map Service Center 
at: msc.fema.gov/portal/home; 
ArcGIS used to calculate the flood 




cap   
The number of flood insurance claims 
processed by the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) within a municipality’s 
present-day boundaries from 1980-1990 




Accessed through the OpenFEMA 
“FIMA NFIP Redacted Claims 







The number of flood insurance claims 
processed by the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) within a municipality’s 
present-day boundaries within the 
preceding 3 years divided by the 
municipality’s population in 2009.  
2007-
2017 
Accessed through the OpenFEMA 
“FIMA NFIP Redacted Claims 





The municipally set tax rate used to 
calculate local property taxes. The rate 
represents the amount of tax due each year 




Accessed through the Florida 
Department of Revenue’s annual 








The total taxable property value in a 
municipality (after accounting for all 
property exemptions) divided by the 
municipality’s population in 2009.   
2008-
2018 
Accessed through the Florida 
Department of Revenue’s annual 






The sum of long-term debt of a 
municipality government divided by the 
municipality’s population in 2009.  
2009-
2018 
Accessed through the Florida 
Department of Financial Service’s 
annual “Total Revenues, Expenditures 





A local government’s spending on law 
enforcement each year from 2009-2018 
divided by its 2009 population. 
2009-
2018 
Accessed through the Florida 
Department of Financial Service’s 
annual “Expenditure Details” report, 





A local government’s spending on roads 
and streets each year from 2009-2018 
divided by its 2009 population. 
2009-
2018 
Accessed through the Florida 
Department of Financial Service’s 
annual “Expenditure Details” report, 
published online at: 
apps.fldfs.com/LocalGov/Reports/ 
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A local government’s spending on 
libraries, parks, and special events each 




Accessed through the Florida 
Department of Financial Service’s 
annual “Expenditure Details” report, 








The Zillow Single-family Home Value 
Index each year from 2010-2019 for a 
municipality.  The Zillow Single-family 
Home Value Index is a measure of a 
typical home’s value as determined by 




Accessed through Zillow Research’s 




The population of a municipality (“place”), 
as compiled by the American Community 
Survey’s 2009 5-year estimates.  
2009 Accessed through Social Explorer’s 
American Community Survey tables, 
available at: www.socialexplorer.com/ 
tables/ACS2009_5yr. ArcGIS used to 




The population of a municipality (“place”), 
as compiled by the American Community 
Survey’s 2009 5-year estimates, divided by 
its land area in square kilometers. 
2009 Accessed through Social Explorer’s 
American Community Survey tables, 
available at: www.socialexplorer.com/ 
tables/ACS2009_5yr. ArcGIS used to 





The median household income in 2009 
inflation-adjusted dollars of a municipality 
(“place”), as compiled by the American 
Community Survey’s 2009 5-year 
estimates. 
2009 Accessed through Social Explorer’s 
American Community Survey tables, 







The number of housing units in a 
municipality (“place”) where the owner or 
co-owner lives in the unit, even if it is 
mortgaged or not fully paid for, divided by 
its 2009 population.  
2009 Accessed through Social Explorer’s 
American Community Survey tables, 




A summary measure of income inequality 
at the municipal (“place”) level. The index 
ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 
(perfect inequality).  
2009 Accessed through Social Explorer’s 
American Community Survey tables, 
available at: www.socialexplorer.com/ 
tables/ACS2009_5yr 
Variable Name Mean S.D. Min Max # of 
Observatio
ns 
Participate 2009 0.421 0.494 0 1 404 
Participate 2018 0.469 0.499 0 1 405 
Active CRS Score 1025.825 283.644 231 1889 1742 
2009-2018 Change in Active CRS 
Score  
164.111 219.097 -748.693 914.904 190 
Flood Zone Percentage   0.343 0.284 0 1 403 
1980-90 Flood Claims per cap (#) 0.00861 0.0323 0 0.380 405 
Recent Flood Claims per cap (#) 0.00256 0.0180 0 0.669 405 
Millage Rate ($/$1000) 4.826 2.218 0.00148 10 3726 
Taxable Property Value per cap 
($) 
143346.5 316090.4 5079.517 5117655 3737 
Debt per cap ($) 2122.007 7006.848 0 116957.9 4005 
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4.1.1. Participation and CRS scores over time 
 
Beginning with question (1): an overview of my set of Florida 
municipalities indicates two observations – municipalities enter (and exit) the CRS 
program, and participating municipalities increase (or decrease) their active score 
totals over the study period.  To see the degree to which program participation is 
increasing each year (as would be expected, if local governments are in fact 
responding to the growing risks from flooding due to climate change), I first run 
Regression 1A: 
 
(1A)  Pr(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)̂ = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  
 
This linear probability model estimates the correlation between participation (equal 
to 1 in each year for CRS participating communities in that year and 0 otherwise) 
and time (from 2009 to 2018) for town i in year t.  The town-level fixed effect is 
denoted by ui. I elect to use a linear probability model for ease of interpretation, but 
I run a logistic regression (not shown) as a robustness check and find similar results.  
For this and all following panel regressions, I use robust standard errors and cluster 
at the town level.   
Next, focusing on the municipalities that are participating in the program, I 
analyze whether these local governments are investing more in active CRS 
measures (e.g. flood protection measures) over the study period (2009-2018) by 
estimating the correlation between time and active CRS score for town i in year t in 
Regression 1B: 
 
(1B)  𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 
I run specifications with and without city-level fixed effects for both regressions to 
determine how much variation can be explained by non-time varying town 
characteristics.  
 
Police Spend per cap ($) 388.217 406.310 0.00302 4172.149 3443 
Road Spend per cap ($) 153.572 218.890 0.728 4384.267 3748 
Park Spend per cap ($) 127.108 167.3214 0 1992.315 3457 
ZHVI ($) 269561.8 421669 28678.33 5263528 3953 
2009 Population 22990.32 57531.76 121 802843 404 
2009 Pop Density (persons per 
km^2)  
933.896 1072.69 8.155 8338.15 403 
2009 Median Income 57205.13 28045.8 21998 265442 404 
2009 Owner Occupied Homes per 
cap 
0.284 0.0860 0.0776 0.605 404 
2009 Gini Index 0.446 0.0657 0.255 0.636 404 
# of Panel Observations  2750     
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4.1.2. Determinants of CRS participation 
 
Turning to question (2), I examine three different measures of government 
provision of flood protection: CRS program participation at the end of the study 
period (2018), average active CRS score from 2009-2018, and change in active 
CRS score from 2009-2018.   
 
(2A)   Pr(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2018 = 1|𝑋)̂ = 𝑏0 +  𝑏1𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 +
 𝑏2𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 +  𝑏3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡=2009+𝑏4 ∑ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖
1990
𝑡=1980 + 𝑏5𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 +
𝑏6𝑃𝑜𝑝_𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡=2009 +   𝑏7𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 +   𝑏8𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡=2009 +
  𝑏9𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏10𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡=2009 
 
I first run Regression 2A (a linear probability model) to examine the extent to 
which each of the following factors influence a municipality’s participation in the 
CRS program at the end of my study period (2018): baseline financial capacity, 
historic flood history, flood risk, and a series of baseline demographic and socio-
economic town characteristics.  I employ 2009 millage rate, 2009 taxable property 
value per capita,8 and 2009 debt per capita as measures of baseline financial 
capacity, hypothesizing that lower millage rates, higher property values, and lower 
debt levels would promote flood protection investment. In the case of millage rates, 
a lower rate could provide a government with greater flexibility to raise rates in 
order to afford flood protection investments.  I then include per capita number of 
flood claims from 1980 to 19909 as a measure of historic flood history and flood 
zone percentage as a proxy for flood risk, predicting that a higher number of historic 
flood claims and a greater percentage of land area in a flood zone would lead to 
greater investment.  Finally, I include 2009 population density as a city built 
environment control in order to test for whether density affects investment (I predict 
that more people and property at risk from flooding – and thus higher expected 
flood losses – would incentivize investment), 2009 median income as a test for 
whether flood protection is a normal good, 2009 owner occupied homes per capita 
as a proxy for resident engagement (I hypothesize that owner-occupants would be 
more engaged in matters pertaining to long-term investment decisions), 2009 Gini 
Index as a test for whether population heterogeneity affects investment, and 2009 
population as an additional control (but with an uncertain impact – larger cities 
would likely have more resources to engage in flood risk mitigation, but these cities 
 
8 Taxable value includes residential and commercial properties.  
9 The FEMA CRS program was established in 1990. Floods prior to 1990 would have occurred in 
the absence of CRS-incentivized flood risk mitigation measures – this variable could thus be a 
candidate for an exogenous predictor of program participation and investment. 
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may also have more competing priorities).  I run specifications with and without 
different variables due to concerns about collinearity.10  
I next focus on participating communities and the factors that influence their 
degree of participation in the program:  
 
(2B)   𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐶𝑅𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?,2009−2018 = 𝑏0 +  𝑏1𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡=200 +
 𝑏2𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 +  𝑏3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡=2009+𝑏4 ∑ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖
1990
𝑡=1980 + 𝑏5𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 +
𝑏6𝑃𝑜𝑝_𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡=2009 +   𝑏7𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 +   𝑏8𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡=2009 +
  𝑏9𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏10𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
In cross-section Regression 2B, I examine the Average Active CRS Score from 
2009-2018 for town i as a function of the baseline indicators used in Regression 
2A.  This specification aims to explain who were “high-performing” cities during 
the study period, whether they began the study period with already-high CRS scores 
or increased scores during the period.  
Finally, Regression 2C examines the 2009-2018 change in active CRS 
score for town i as a function of baseline characteristics: 
 
(2C)   ∆𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡=2009−2018 = 𝑏0 +  𝑏1𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 +
  𝑏2𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 +  𝑏3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡=2009+ 𝑏4 ∑ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖
1990
𝑡=1980 + 𝑏5𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 +
𝑏6𝑃𝑜𝑝_𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡=2009 +   𝑏7𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 +   𝑏8𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡=2009 +
  𝑏9𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏10𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
I use the same independent variables as in Regression 2A and 2B, with the objective 
of determining what 2009 town characteristics predict score changes over the next 
10-year period.  This specification differs from 2B in that it focuses on towns with 
large changes in the score over the study period; “high performing” towns that 
entered the period with high scores and maintained those scores would have a 
recorded change of “0”.  The differences between both specifications determine 
whether the characteristics of towns making CRS investments from 2009-2018 
differ from those of towns that made investments prior to 2009. 
 
4.1.3. Home values and investment in flood mitigation 
 
Turning to question (3), I analyze the relationship between median home 
value (as measured by the community’s Zillow single-family Home Value Index11) 
and local government investment in flood protection.  
 
10 Correlated variables (>0.40) include median income and tax value (0.51), debt and tax value 
(.67), owner occupied homes and tax value (0.41), Gini index and tax value (0.44), owner 
occupied homes and median income (0.43), and flood zone % and 1980-90 flood claims (0.45).   
11 I focus solely on single-family homes in order to allow for a more precise comparison between 
home values across municipalities.  
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 I first examine program participation in each year from 2009 to 2018 and 
home values in the following year in panel Regression 3A: 
 
(3A)   𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 ∑ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑡−4 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
I incorporate an interaction term between participate and flood zone percentage in 
order to determine the additional effects of program participation in high flood zone 
percentage cities, as well as an interaction term with 2009 median income to 
determine whether there is a differential effect on home values among different 
income CRS participating cities.  I include a series of one-year lagged variables 
controlling for changing tax levels and provision of other local public goods: 
millage rate, police spending per capita, road spending per capita, and park 
spending per capita.  In the state of Florida, schools are the purview of county 
governments, so these “other public goods” variables likely capture the most 
perceptible differences between municipalities.  I predict that increases in park 
spending would be correlated with rising home values, while a rise in police 
spending could have opposing effects (either resulting in higher values due to 
increases in public safety, or lower values if higher spending is a response to rising 
crime).  Higher road spending could likewise either raise home values (better 
infrastructure; less potholes) or lower home values (if spending is a response to 
higher traffic levels).  Finally, I include a recent flood claims variable to control for 
any “shocks” to the housing market in the form of major hurricanes or other flood 
events. I further include city and time-fixed effects, in order to control for non-time 
varying city characteristics (baseline flood risk; natural amenities; distance to 
employment centers) and to control for fluctuations in home prices in each year.  
In Regression 3B, I next turn to CRS participating cities, and I use the same 
specification as in 3A but with active CRS score in town i in year t as my 
independent variable of interest:  
 
(3B)   𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 ∑ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖
𝑡−1
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 Figure 1.                                                Figure 2.
 
 
Table 5: (1A) CRS Participation 2009-2018 
Notes: Observations in columns 1-2 are city-years for all cities (405), with participation = 1 for 
participating cities, 0 otherwise. Observations in columns 3-4 are city-years for all municipalities 
participating in the CRS program (199). Robust standard errors clustered by city in brackets: 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Turning first to question (1): is the level of public flood protection 
increasing, as measured by local governments’ provision of this public good?  
Looking first at CRS program participation, the results in columns 1 and 2 suggest 
that time is statistically significant relative to program participation.12 This 
confirms what is shown in Figure 1, whereby the number of cities participating 
increased after 2015.  In 2009, 170 cities (out of 404) were participating; in 2018, 
190 (out of 40513) were.  Meanwhile, columns 3 and 4 analyze active CRS scores, 
and the results in column 4 indicate that there is a steady increase in score with each 
passing year, averaging 23 points (2.24% of the average annual score) within cities.  
The high R-squared value in the column 4 specification with fixed effects suggests 
that underlying town characteristics explain most of the variation in score changes.  
 
12 The magnitude and significance of the coefficient on Time are robust to a logistic specification 
(not shown).     
13 Estero, FL was incorporated in 2014; Westlake, FL was incorporated in 2016; Islandia, FL was 
unincorporated in 2012.  
Dependent variable: CRS Participation Active CRS Scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time 0.00507*** 0.00514*** 20.57*** 23.01*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [2.403] [2.259] 
Constant 0.403*** 0.403*** 910.6*** 896.9*** 











Observations 4,038 4,038 1,742 1,742 
R-squared 
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There is a slight decrease in average annual score after 2015 (Figure 2), perhaps 
coinciding with the growth in program participation (newly participating cities 
would likely enter the program with lower scores).  
 
Table 6: (2A) Predicting CRS Program Participation in 2018 
Notes: Observations are cities with available data (372). Regressions predict CRS participation in 
2018 (Participate = 1, 0 otherwise). Robust standard errors clustered by city in 
brackets:***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Moving to question (2): What factors predict local government investment 
in flood risk protection?  Table 6 presents the results for CRS program 
participation in 2018.14 Column 1 includes financial capacity and flood risk 
variables, apart from debt.  Columns 2, 3, and 4 further incorporate socio-economic 
and demographic controls.  Column 2 includes median income and Gini index but 
excludes millage rate and tax value.  Column 3 includes owner-occupied homes but 
excludes taxable value, median income, and Gini index.  Column 4 includes all 
variables, and column 5 includes population as an additional control.   
Flood zone %, population density, and median income are significant 
positive predictors across all specifications, with a one standard deviation (SD) 
 
14 The relative magnitude and significance of the coefficients are robust to a logistic specification 
(not shown).     
Dependent Variable: CRS Participation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2009 Millage Rate  -0.0195  -0.0176 -0.0156 -0.0230** 
   ($/$1,000) [0.012]  [0.013] [0.013] [0.011] 
2009 Taxable Value per  0.0159***   -0.00912 0.000282 
   capita ($100,000s) [0.005]   [0.015] [0.012] 
2009 Debt per capita   0.00120 0.00322 0.00354 0.000669 
   ($1,000s)  [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004] 
1980-90 Flood Claims  0.928* 1.104** 0.724 0.882* 1.081** 
    per capita (#) [0.492] [0.517] [0.467] [0.510] [0.474] 
Flood Zone (% in  0.256** 0.246** 0.275*** 0.237** 0.270*** 
    decimal) [0.101] [0.108] [0.100] [0.109] [0.100] 
2009 Population Density  0.0140*** 0.0128*** 0.0139*** 0.0133*** 0.00876*** 
   (100s) [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
2009 Median Income   0.0286**  0.0273* 0.0223* 
   ($10,000s)  [0.013]  [0.015] [0.013] 
2009 Owner Occupied    0.565* 0.253 0.639** 
   Homes per capita (#)   [0.341] [0.359] [0.321] 
2009 Gini Index (1-0)  0.438  0.476 0.140 
  [0.404]  [0.421] [0.369] 
2009 Population      0.0460*** 
   (10,000s)     [0.010] 
Constant 0.316*** -0.0988 0.159 -0.103 -0.0806 
 [0.071] [0.172] [0.126] [0.229] [0.201] 
      
Observations 372 372 372 372 372 
R-squared 0.184 0.201 0.187 0.207 0.348 
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increase in flood zone % (0.28), population density (1,073), and median income 
(28,046) increasing the probability of participation by 6.6-7.7%, 9.4-15.0%, and 
6.3-8.0%, respectively.  Flood claims per capita is consistently significant and 
positive in all specifications except column 3, with a one SD increase (0.032) 
associated with a 2.8-3.5% increased probability.  Population is also a positive 
predictor, with a one SD (57,000) increase associated with a 26.2% higher 
probability.  Taxable value per capita has a significant and positive coefficient in 
column 1, but this significance disappears with additional controls (and 
interpretation is made difficult due to high correlations with debt, median income, 
and Gini index).  Owner occupied homes per capita is significant and positive in 
columns 3 and 5, but this significance disappears in the absence of a population 
control in column 4.  Millage rate is likewise significant (but negative) when 
controlling for population.   
Overall, it appears that towns with higher flood zone percentages, more 
historic flood claims, higher population densities, higher median incomes, and 
larger populations tend to participate in the CRS program.  Less certain but positive 
predictors of participation include the number of owner-occupied homes and 
taxable value, while higher millage rates are a negative predictor.  These results 
suggest that the cities that are participating are those with higher expected flood 
losses (more land area in flood zones and greater densities of people and property), 
wealthier residents (program participation appears to be a “normal good”), and 
more owner-occupiers (and residents who may be more engaged with long-term 
issues).   
 
Table 7 presents results for average active CRS score.  Column 1 includes 
financial capacity and flood risk variables, except for debt.  Column 2 includes debt 
and a population control but excludes tax value.  Columns 3-5 incorporate socio-
economic and demographic controls.  Column 3 includes median income and Gini 
index but excludes millage rate and tax value.  Column 4 includes all variables, 
while column 5 again incorporates population.   
Population density and median income have significant negative 
coefficients across specifications, with a one SD increase in each (1,072 additional 
residents; a $28,045 increase in income) associated with a 53.1-73.7-point decrease 
(5.2-7.2% of the average score of 1,026) and 50.2-60.0-point (4.9-5.8%) decrease 
in score, respectively.  Meanwhile, greater inequality (a higher Gini index) has a 
positive association with score, with a 1 SD (0.0657) increase associated with a 
44.2-60.0-point increase in score.  Columns 2 and 5 suggest that population is 
positive and significant, with every additional 57,000 residents associated with an 
additional 73.3-75.6 points.  Flood zone % has a significant and positive coefficient 
in all specifications but column 4, with a 0.28 increase predicting a 36.7-45.3-point 
increase in score.  Millage is a consistent negative predictor of average scores, with 
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the significant coefficients in columns 2 and 5 suggesting a 50-point decrease with 
every 2.22 mill increase in property tax rates.  Debt is significant and negative in 
the absence of tax value (columns 2 and 3), while taxable value is significant and 
negative in 1 and 4.  The high correlation between both variables (0.67) makes 
interpretation of their coefficients difficult, but the results suggest that higher 
taxable values, even when controlling for debt, are associated with lower scores, 
while the association between debt and score is less clear.  
 
Table 7: (2B) Predicting Average Active CRS Score from 2009-2018 
Notes: Observations are cities participating in the CRS program and with available data (189). 
Regressions predict Average Active CRS score from 2009-2018. Robust standard errors clustered 
by city in brackets: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 Overall, it appears that towns with larger populations, greater inequality (as 
measured by a higher Gini index), lower population densities, and lower median 
incomes have higher average scores, with lower taxable values, lower millage rates, 
and higher flood zone percentages additional (but less certain) predictors of higher 
scores.  These results suggest that the driving forces behind higher active CRS 
scores are different than those behind program participation: while population 
density, income, and taxable value are positive predictors of participation, these 
variables have negative associations with score.  Additionally, historic flood claims 
Dependent Variable: Average Active CRS Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2009 Millage Rate  -16.74 -22.75**  -17.36 -22.08** 
   ($/$1,000) [12.048] [11.200]  [11.928] [11.140] 
2009 Taxable Value per  -8.466**   -19.31* -14.90 
    capita ($100,000s) [3.759]   [10.714] [10.904] 
2009 Debt per capita   -2.326*** -2.628** 3.437 1.817 
   ($1,000s)  [0.884] [1.018] [3.635] [3.652] 
1980-90 Flood Claims  -141.5 -41.51 -68.00 -252.0 -239.8 
    per capita (#) [399.220] [391.205] [383.894] [394.742] [391.206] 
Flood Zone (% in  150.0* 161.7** 130.9* 124.5 147.1* 
    decimal) [79.820] [76.550] [74.312] [86.405] [83.907] 
2009 Population Density  -4.955*** -5.996*** -6.674*** -6.055*** -6.867*** 
   (100s) [1.808] [1.794] [1.663] [1.733] [1.728] 
2009 Median Income    -17.91** -16.63* -16.28* 
   ($10,000s)   [8.061] [9.091] [8.877] 
2009 Owner Occupied     281.5 541.7 
   Homes per capita (#)    [322.995] [330.974] 
2009 Gini Index (1-0)   816.6*** 913.0*** 672.3** 
   [310.676] [327.426] [323.197] 
2009 Population   13.26***   12.83*** 
   (10,000s)  [3.157]   [3.360] 
Constant 1,091*** 1,061*** 778.9*** 736.3*** 733.0*** 
 [68.513] [66.894] [137.130] [191.162] [185.406] 
      
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 
R-squared 0.083 0.146 0.111 0.139 0.198 
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have a positive (and significant) association with participation but are insignificant 
with regards to score.  Conversely, inequality (as measured by the Gini index) is 
not significant for participation but is significant with regards to score.  
 
Table 8: (2C) Predicting Change in Active CRS Score 2009-2018 
Notes: Observations in columns 1-5 are cities participating in the CRS program and with available 
data (189). Column 6 is cities participating in the CRS program in 2009 (163). Regressions predict 
2009-2018 change in active CRS points. Robust standard errors clustered by city in brackets: 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Table 8 presents results for change in active CRS score from 2009-2018.  
Column 1 includes all financial capacity and flood risk variables.  Columns 2-5 
incorporate socio-economic and demographic controls.  Column 2 includes median 
income but excludes tax value and millage rate.  Column 3 includes median income 
but excludes tax value and median income.  Column 4 includes all variables, and 
column 5 adds population as a control.  Finally, column 6 examines the association 
between 2009 active CRS score and change in score.  
In comparison to Table 7, the signs on millage rate, population density, 
owner occupied homes, and population are the same, although none of the variables 
are significant.  Meanwhile, the signs on flood claims, flood zone %, Gini index, 
Dependent Variable: Change in Active CRS Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2009 Millage Rate -3.072  -5.127 -4.314 -5.143  
   ($/$1,000) [9.549]  [9.446] [9.702] [9.879]  
2009 Taxable Value per -1.379   4.228 5.004  
   capita ($100,000s) [6.769]   [8.713] [8.635]  
2009 Debt per capita 1.731 1.271* 1.932*** 0.604 0.320  
   ($1,000s) [2.552] [0.700] [0.594] [2.797] [2.779]  
1980-90 Flood Claims per 225.8 240.7 221.7 219.6 221.7  
   capita (#) [318.683] [319.919] [311.553] [313.746] [314.160]  
Flood Zone (% in  -113.5* -110.7** -98.74* -107.9* -104.0  
    decimal) [61.086] [54.947] [59.455] [63.807] [64.302]  
2009 Population Density -0.928 -1.037 -0.528 -0.484 -0.627  
   (100s) [1.486] [1.466] [1.516] [1.511] [1.549]  
2009 Median Income  -0.150  -1.260 -1.198  
   ($10,000s)  [7.085]  [9.432] [9.399]  
2009 Owner Occupied    34.29 79.97  
   Homes per capita (#)    [232.729] [246.489]  
2009 Gini Index (1-0)   -376.7 -441.5* -483.8*  
   [237.433] [262.375] [268.228]  
2009 Population      2.253  
   (10,000s)     [2.395]  
2009 Active CRS Score      -0.396*** 
      [0.065] 
Constant 228.5*** 214.8*** 396.5*** 419.1*** 418.5*** 669.5*** 
 [57.423] [54.472] [121.372] [147.392] [147.806] [144.994] 
       
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 163 
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.257 
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tax value in columns 4-5 and debt in columns 2-3 are opposite between both tables, 
with flood zone, Gini index, and debt having significant signs in select 
specifications.  A one SD increase in flood zone, Gini index, and debt per capita 
(0.28, .0657, and $7,007) is associated with a 27.6-31.8-point decrease in score 
(16.8-19.4% of the average change of 164.1 points), 29.0-31.8-point decrease, and 
8.9-13.5-point increase (5.4-8.2%) across significant specifications, respectively.   
Overall, it appears that the towns making the largest improvements in their 
scores during this time period are different from those that have the highest average 
scores.  2009 CRS score has a negative 0.40 association with change in score, 
suggesting that participating cities with high scores in 2009 increased their scores 
by less when compared to 2009 participating cities with low scores and/or cities 
that entered the program during the study period.  Higher flood zone percentage 
and more unequal cities appear to have been the “first movers” when it comes to 
active CRS score, while the “more recent movers” are at lower flood risk (when 
proxied by flood zone percentage), more equal, and appear to have higher debt 
loads (perhaps directly related to their flood prevention investments).   
 
 Turning to Question (3): is there a relationship between flood provision and 
home values, and does this vary by flood risk or income?  Table 9 examines CRS 
program participation and the effects on median home values.  Column 1 examines 
whether there is a relationship between participation and home value according to 
the panel specification; column 2 adds an interaction term with flood zone; column 
3 adds taxation and public goods provision controls; columns 4 and 5 add 
interaction terms, first with flood zone and then with median income; column 6 
repeats the column 3 specification but with recent flood claims per capita as an 
additional control.  
 Focusing first on columns 1 and 3, the results suggest that there is a positive 
but not statistically significant association between program participation and 
median home values. The point estimate indicates that participation is associated 
with a $6,079 increase in home values (2.3% of the mean value of $269,562) in 
column 1.  This drops to a $3,579 increase (1.3% of the mean) when controlling for 
tax levels and public goods, with the 95% confidence interval extending from -
$16,718 to $23,876.  The magnitude rises to $5,675 when controlling for recent 
flood claims in column 6.  The interaction terms in columns 2 and 4 provide mixed 
evidence for whether there is a differential effect on home values in towns with 
large flood zones: participation in a city with 63% of its land area in a flood zone 
(one SD above the average 34%) is associated with an insignificant $13,847 
increase in home values (3.3% of the mean value of $416,690, when using the 
predicted home value based on a regression of ZHVI on flood zone %) in column 2, 
but the magnitude drops to $3,209 (0.7% of the mean) in column 4 in the presence 
of control variables.  Interacting with median income in column 5, the results do 
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provide evidence for a differential effect on home values in high income locales: 
the interaction term is significantly different from zero. The magnitudes suggest 
that participation for a city with a median income of $85,250 (1 SD above the mean) 
is associated with an insignificant $21,738 increase (4.1% of the mean value of 
$528,053, when using the predicted home value based on a regression of ZHVI on 
median income), with the confidence interval extending from -$5,195 to $48,671.  
However, for a city with a median income at the 25th percentile ($38,980), the 
magnitude drops to -$16,807 (-16.2% of the mean home value of $103,649).  
Meanwhile, millage rate and park spending are both significant across 
specifications, with results suggesting that housing markets do value park spending 
(though this correlation does not extend to police or road spending) and that higher 
taxes are capitalized in the form of lower home values. 
 
Table 9: (3A) Homes Values and CRS Participation 2009-2018 
Notes: Observations are city-years for cities with available data (305), with one less year of data 
for column 6. Regressions predict the impact of 1-year lagged CRS program participation 
(Participate = 1, 0 otherwise) on the Zillow home value index from 2010-2019. Robust standard 
errors clustered by city in brackets: 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 Overall, the results suggest that there is no statistically significant effect 
from CRS participation on home values.  However, based on relative magnitudes 
Dependent Variable: Median Home Value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CRS Participation (t-1) 6,079 -4,239 3,579 4,070 -49,280** 5,675 
 [10,184.49] [14,232.32] [10,314.72] [13,187.48] [23,426.29] [10,667.67] 
City Millage Rate (t-1)   -16,094** -16,099** -16,094** -16,628** 
   ($/$1,000)   [7,654.752] [7,667.230] [7,651.596] [8,270.012] 
Police spending per capita   375.3 375.4 353.7 -72.22 
   (t-1) ($10s)   [1,686.712] [1,687.996] [1,689.669] [1,838.419] 
Road spending per capita   523.3 523.2 522.0 403.0 
   (t-1) ($10s)   [431.399] [430.985] [431.923] [417.906] 
Park spending per capita   1,739* 1,739* 1,735* 1,708* 
   (t-1) ($10s)   [948.717] [952.379] [949.949] [945.356] 
CRS Participation (t-1) x  28,709  -1,366   
   Flood Zone (% in       
   decimal) 
 [37,283.10]  [40,758.75]   
CRS Participation (t-1) x     8,330**  
   2009 Median Income 
   ($10,000s) 
    [3,740.937]  
Recent Flood Claims per      -78,710 
   capita (#)      [68,689.95] 
Constant 209,445*** 208,946*** 241,066*** 241,107*** 242,456*** 259,039*** 
 [6,949.431] [7,063.580] [83,518.84] [83,343.85] [83,735.28] [90,642.46] 
       
City & Year Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,773 2,773 2,773 2,773 2,773 2,498 
R-squared 0.957 0.957 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 
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and confidence intervals, there is evidence that participation has higher magnitude 
and higher percentage effects on home values in towns with higher median 
incomes.   
 
Table 10: (3B) Home Prices and Active CRS Score 2009-2018 
Notes: Observations are city-years for cities participating in the CRS program and with available 
data (167), with one less year of data for column 6. Regressions predict the impact of 1-year 
lagged Active CRS scores on the Zillow Home Value Index from 2010-2019. Robust standard 
errors clustered by city in brackets: 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 Table 10 presents results for active CRS scores for all program participating 
cities, with columns following the same pattern as in Table 9.   
 Beginning with column 3, the results suggest that on average, across towns, 
increases in active CRS score have a significant but negative effect on home values 
in the following year.  Controlling for taxes and public goods, every 100-point 
increase (a roughly 10% improvement on the mean score of 1,026) is associated 
with a $6,250 decrease in home values (-2.3% of the mean of $269,562), with the 
95% confidence interval extending from -$11,340 to -$1,160.  The magnitude is 
slightly larger when also controlling for recent flood claims in column 6.  The 
results for the interaction term in column 4 provide evidence for a differential effect 
on home values in towns with large flood zones, with a positive and statistically 
Dependent Variable: Median Home Value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Active CRS Score (t-1) -6,754** -17,082*** -6,250** -15,645*** -29,667* -6,948** 
   (100s) [2,786.03] [6,020.46] [2,577.885] [5,809.670] [15,979.31] [2,747.685] 
City Millage Rate (t-1)   -44,452** -42,953** -43,167** -44,463** 
   (mills)   [18,230.65] [17,490.96] [17,678.04] [18,004.09] 
Police spending per   -3,035 -2,967 -3,006 -3,578 
   capita (t-1) ($10s)   [2,767.037] [2,781.782] [2,771.663] [2,851.469] 
Road spending per   422.9 328.1 415.6 163.2 
   capita (t-1) ($10s)   [530.851] [522.812] [529.636] [633.175] 
Park spending per   2,212 2,273 2,145 2,514 
   capita (t-1) ($10s)   [1,576.564] [1,566.146] [1,530.411] [1,811.750] 
Active CRS Score (t-1)  30,471**  27,588**   
   (100s) x Flood Zone % 
   (dec) 
 [11,751.1]  [13,071.66]   
Active CRS Score (t-1)     3,853  
   (100s) x 2009 Median 
   Income ($10,000s) 
    [2,392.099]  
Recent Flood Claims      -69,796 
   per capita (#)      [43,332.24] 
Constant 331,711*** 311,228*** 602,240*** 575,288*** 589,736*** 629,661*** 
 [16,867.4] [20,992.2] [160,357.5] [163,033.5] [161,342.9] [163,970.2] 
       
City & Year Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,362 1,362 1,362 1,362 1,362 1,210 
R-squared 0.958 0.959 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 
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significant interaction between active score and flood zone %.  Evaluated at realistic 
values, however, the estimated change in home prices is not statistically significant: 
a 100-point increase in a city with 63% of its land in a flood zone is associated with 
a $1,735 increase in home values (2.3% of the mean value of $416,690), with the 
confidence interval extending from -$6,890 to $10,360.  Interacting with median 
income in column 5, the results provide suggestive evidence for a differential effect 
on home values in high income cities, but the results are again not significant: a 
100-point increase in a city with a median income of $85,250 is associated with a 
$3,178 increase in home values (0.6% of the mean value of $528,053), with the 
confidence interval extending from -$7,679 to $14,036.  This association drops to 
a $14,649 decrease in home values (-14.1% of the mean value of $103,649) for a 
city with a $38,980 median income, with the confidence interval ranging from -
$28,499 to -$799.  Meanwhile, millage rate again has a significant and negative 
association with home values.15   
 Overall, it appears that active CRS score levels have a significant and 
negative association with home values in the average Florida municipality, but CRS 
scores in cities with more land area in flood zones and/or higher median incomes 




 Through the lens of the FEMA Community Rating System program, local 
governments in the state are responding to rising flood risks.  From 2009-2018, 
there has been an 11.8% increase in CRS program participation among 
municipalities and a 19.8% increase in average “active” scores among CRS 
participating municipalities.  This increase in active scores suggests that 
communities are investing more in stormwater systems and flood protection 
infrastructure, setting stricter building codes, acquiring and demolishing at-risk 
properties, and preserving open spaces.   
 The cities that are participating in the program are those most at risk (when 
flood risk is proxied by the percentage of a city’s land area in a FEMA-designated 
high risk flood zone and the number of historic flood claims) and those with higher 
population densities, higher incomes, and more owner-occupiers, with some 
evidence for a positive association with taxable property values.  These results align 
with Brody et al. (2009), whose study of local jurisdictions in Florida from 1999-
2005 found that the primary driving force of CRS participation was the flood 
insurance premium discounts on offer by the program for communities – higher 
 
15 Millage rate has a significant and negative association with home values, with a one mill 
increase predicting a $42,953-44,463 decrease in home values.  This (seemingly unrealistic, in 
terms of magnitude) result could perhaps be the result of millage rate having a significant 
correlation with other unobserved time-varying city characteristics.   
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population densities and taxable property values would suggest higher potential per 
capita flood insurance savings from participation and thus a greater incentive to 
participate.  Meanwhile, the finding that CRS program participation is associated 
with higher median incomes follows Fan and Davlasheridze (2016), who find that 
the willingness to pay for CRS activities is higher among wealthier households.  
Higher citywide median incomes also suggest lower unemployment and crime 
rates, following a common negative association between crime and income in the 
empirical literature (e.g. Patterson, 1991) and my own findings of a -0.38 
correlation (significant at the 1% level) between median income and unemployment 
rate.16 Following Li and Landry (2018), lower rates of crime and unemployment 
are in turn associated with more mitigation activities, as communities face fewer 
“competing priorities” in the form of crime or economic development issues that 
may crowd out concerns related to the risks of future flood and disaster events.   
Among program participating cities, the localities investing the most in 
“active” CRS measures are those with larger populations, more land area in flood 
zones, greater inequality, and lower population densities, taxable values, millage 
rates, and median incomes.  The negative associations between density and score 
and tax value and score could be explained if “active” CRS activities (e.g. open 
space preservation, stricter building codes) become more expensive with more 
people and development, with the higher costs outweighing benefits from higher 
per capita flood insurance savings and lower expected flood losses.  This aligns 
with Sadiq and Noonan (2015), who find that the communities likeliest to be 
responding to the incentive structure of the CRS program are those with lower 
densities and property values – these communities may have moderate flood risks 
that can be addressed through lower-cost mitigation measures, while the mitigation 
costs for denser communities may outweigh the immediate flood insurance 
discount incentives offered by the program.  These results also suggest that 
communities are not hindered by less financial capacity (in the form of lower 
taxable values) in their ability to make CRS investments, but these communities’ 
lower baseline millage rates also suggest that they may have more room to raise tax 
rates to fund investments.  Meanwhile, the negative association with median 
income could be the result of property costs being lower in the highest flood risk 
cities.  Along the lines of Husby et al. (2018), this flood risk discount would attract 
lower income households willing to make a tradeoff between lower property costs 
but higher flood risks.  At the same time, these low property values may also attract 
high income households with the means to self-insure against flood losses or afford 
 
16 I exclude unemployment rate from my (2) series regressions due to this high correlation, 
selecting median income as my preferred indicator of community socio-economic wellbeing.   
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the high costs of building elevated, flood-proof homes,17 providing a possible 
explanation for the positive association between inequality and score.18 This 
follows Noonan and Sadiq (2018), who find that CRS-participating communities 
attract both poor and wealthy households.  Finally, lower millage rates may also be 
reflective of cities having fewer competing priorities (e.g. in the form of high 
policing or economic development expenditures) and thus a greater capacity to 
invest in flood risk mitigation.  
The characteristics of the cities that made the largest increases in score 
differ from those that simply had the highest scores from 2009-2018, with less land 
area in flood zones, lower inequality, and higher debt loads predicting large score 
changes.  One explanation could be that lower flood risk cities (as proxied by flood 
zone %) are “catching-up” to higher risk cities that have already taken mitigation 
measures.  The positive association with debt suggests that financial capacity again 
does not appear to be a limiting factor for cities making investments in CRS 
measures.  Meanwhile, the results in this case for inequality align with a classic 
result in the public economics literature, whereby more homogenous cities devote 
more spending to “productive” public goods (e.g. Alesina et al., 1999). 
Across both “active” score analyses, two further conclusions can be made: 
while both the number of owner-occupied homes per capita and the number of 
1980-90 flood claims are significant predictors of program participation, neither is 
a driving force of higher scores, suggesting that historic flood claims are not strong 
predictors of flood risk mitigation today and that owner-occupiers are not 
necessarily more engaged in flood risk mitigation issues.  Overall, the CRS 
program appears to be adequately targeting and incentivizing some higher flood 
risk communities to participate and invest in “active” mitigation measures, and 
financial constraints in the form of lower median incomes, lower taxable values, 
and higher debt loads do not appear to be a hindrance to investment.  However, 
denser communities appear to be investing less in these measures, which suggests 
that cities with higher mitigation costs are not being adequately targeted and 
incentivized by the program.   
 Given the incentive structure of the CRS program, the effects from 
participation on a home’s value (if any) would be expected to come through two 
routes: flood insurance savings and lower expected flood losses.  Combining the 
average class ranking of “7” for cities in my dataset, an average nationwide NFIP 
flood insurance premium of $642 (Insurance Information Institute, 2019), and a 5-
15% discount on flood insurance premiums (depending on a home’s location) for 
 
17 Anecdotally, many Florida coastal communities are increasingly a “mishmash” between older, 
ground-level (and cheaper) bungalows and newer, elevated (and expensive) mansions, providing 
support for this “flood zone-driven inequality” hypothesis. 
18 There is a positive correlation of 0.29 between Gini index and flood zone % (significant at the 
1% level), providing some further evidence for this “flood zone-driven inequality” hypothesis.  
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properties in CRS class 7 communities (FEMA, 2017), the discounted lifetime 
flood insurance savings (assuming a 2% interest rate and a 50 year home lifespan) 
would range from $1,009 to $3,026 for a city that enters the CRS program.  
 The real-world analysis of CRS participation on homes values appears less 
clear-cut, with statistically insignificant findings.  Program participation is 
associated with a $3,579 increase in home values (1.3% of the median home value 
in the average city), with the 95% confidence interval extending from -$16,718 to 
$23,876.  Although this $3,579 finding is insignificant, it does appear to be within 
the realm of possibility, given the above (conservative) approximation of an 
average flood-insurance-carrying-home’s lifetime premium savings.  There is 
evidence suggesting that housing markets in wealthier cities value the program 
more, with both higher magnitude and higher percentage effects on home prices in 
higher median income communities.  This provides further evidence that CRS 
program participation is a normal good and aligns with Fan and Davlasheridze 
(2016), who find that the willingness to pay for CRS activities is higher among 
wealthier households.   
 Meanwhile, results for active CRS scores show a significant and negative 
association with home values in the average Florida municipality, with some 
evidence for less negative (or positive) effects on home values in higher flood risk 
and higher income communities.  These counterintuitive results – at least when 
considered within this paper’s theoretical framework – could be explained in two 
ways: either the marginal costs of mitigation, above and beyond any increases in 
millage rates (e.g. non-property tax fees, such as stormwater fees, or simply the 
inconvenience of construction), outweigh the marginal (perceived) benefits of flood 
risk mitigation measures, or active mitigation measures (such as new stormwater 
systems or higher seawalls) are a “risk signal”, reminding residents and visitors of 
the risks of living in low-lying or coastal areas (and perhaps keeping away new 
homebuyers).  This would align with Gibson et al. (2019), who find that belief 
updating in response to new risk signals (in the form of updated flood maps or flood 
events) drives down affected home prices.  New flood protection infrastructure – 
and any associated town hall meetings and public debates – could play a role akin 
to new flood maps or flood events.   
 
6.1. Limitations  
  
 This analysis misses one perhaps crucial aspect of the CRS program: 
cooperation between cities and within counties on issues pertaining to flood risk 
mitigation.  Specifically, the part (2) regressions assume that individual 
governments act independently of one another.  However, in the context of flood 
risk mitigation, it is probable that there do exist interjurisdictional spillovers – 
towns may share best practices and human capital, and one town’s actions may 
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induce a neighboring town to follow in its stead.  Furthermore, Florida county 
governments are powerful entities and are also able to participate in the CRS 
program.  Some county risk mitigation measures (e.g. county-wide flood risk 
studies) could inform or directly impact city-level activities within the county.  Both 
factors suggest that spatial autocorrelation could be a source of bias in my part (2) 




 Floods are the costliest natural disasters in the United States, and rising seas, 
more frequent and severe storms, and more intensive floodplain development will 
only increase the human and economic toll from flooding in coming decades 
(Tebaldi et al., 2012; Patricola & Wehner, 2018; Li & Landry, 2018).  Given the 
uncertainties and complexities of climate and flood risks, planning for, mitigating, 
and adapting to these risks falls into the hands of local communities.  Determining 
the extent to which local governments are wary of and responding to the risks of 
climate change, the factors that are driving some (and not others) to proactively 
invest in risk mitigation, and the degree to which housing markets are responding 
to these investments is critical for understanding the broader socioeconomic 
consequences of climate change.  To what extent will the policy mechanisms in 
place serve to accentuate (or mitigate) the welfare costs of climate change?   
In seeking to answer this question, I study flood risk mitigation investments 
among Florida cities and towns from 2009-2018 and their association with home 
values.  Florida’s unique vulnerability to rising sea levels and stronger and more 
severe hurricanes (U.S. EPA, 2016) makes the state a prime setting for a study on 
climate risks, and my study period – a decade that saw a large increase in flood 
events and media attention to climate change (FEMA, 2019; Guertin, 2019) – adds 
a new dimension to the existing literature on FEMA’s Community Rating System 
(CRS).  Using regression analysis, I find that investments in public flood risk 
mitigation are increasing over the study period, with an 11.8% increase in CRS 
program participation and a 19.8% increase in average “active” CRS scores.  CRS 
program participation is associated with more owner-occupiers and higher flood 
risk, population densities, and median incomes.  Active CRS scores are highest in 
cities with more land area in flood zones, higher populations, greater inequality, 
and lower population densities, median incomes, and financial capacity, while the 
cities with the greatest increases in score over the past decade tend to have less land 
area in flood zones and lower inequality.  Using panel estimation with city-level 
fixed effects, I find that program participation is positively but not significantly 
related to median home values, with a point estimate of an increase of $3,580 to 
$5,680.  Active CRS scores are negatively related: every 100-point increase is 
associated with a $6,250 decrease in values in the average community, with 
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evidence for less negative (or positive) effects in cities with more land area in flood 
zones and higher median incomes.  
These results suggest that FEMA’s CRS program is meeting one of its 
primary goals: fostering comprehensive floodplain management (FEMA, 2017).  
Florida cities and municipalities are, on average, responding to the program’s 
incentives, investing more in flood risk mitigation measures, and the program is 
adequately targeting some higher flood risk communities, even if they have fewer 
financial resources.  However, the program does not appear to be adequately 
targeting and incentivizing denser communities with potentially higher mitigation 
costs to invest in these measures.  Finally, housing markets do not appear to value 
flood risk mitigation measures, suggesting that the costs of mitigation to local 
communities may exceed the (perceived) benefits or that these measures are 
themselves indicators of flood risk.   
Programs such as the Community Rating System will continue to play a 
critical role in guiding and incentivizing local governments to plan for, mitigate, 
and adapt to rising flood and climate risks.  Further study of the program’s 
successes, failures, and impacts, as well as those of comparable programs and 
frameworks in nations around the world, is warranted.  The changing climate will 
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 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Community Rating System 
(CRS) revised its scoring system in 2013.  The new system reweighed certain 
“active” CRS activities, with no “crosswalk” or equivalence formula.  Communities 
gradually transitioned to the new system as they received verification visits after 
the changes were made effective in the Spring of 2013 (FEMA, 2017).  My CRS 
scores dataset (extending from 2009-2018) thus includes scores for cities from both 
the old scoring system and the new system, with cities transitioning to the new 
system at various points in time after 2013 (as of 2018, there are still a few cities 
scored on the old system).   
 To “unify” scores from these two disparate scoring systems, I first construct 
a “Predicted Active CRS Score” to transition scores under the new system to the 
old scoring system based on a regression of “Old Active CRS Score” on “New 
Active CRS Score.”  The “Predicted Active CRS Score” is equal to 404.760 + 
0.476*(“New Active CRS Score”).  Next, I construct a “Combined Active CRS 
Score”, bringing together “Old Active CRS Scores” with the “Predicted Active 
CRS Scores.”  Figure A.1 plots the “Old”, “New”, and “Combined” Active CRS 
Scores.  Figure A.2 plots the distribution of the “Old Active CRS Score”; Figure 
A.3 the distribution of the “New Active CRS Score”; Figure A.4 the distribution 
of the “Predicted Active CRS Score.”  
 
  Figure A.1. 
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  Figure A.2. 
 
   
  Figure A.3.            
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